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Institutionalization
What do empirical studies tell us about court mediation?
By Bobbi McAdoo, Nancy A. Welsh, and Roselle L. Wissler
In the 25 years since the Pound
Conference, federal and state courts
throughout the country have adopted
mediation programs to resolve civil dis-
putes. This increased use of mediation
has been accompanied by a small but
growing body of research examining the
effects of certain choices in designing
and implementing court-connected medi-
ation programs.
This article focuses on the lessons
that seem to be emerging from the
available empirical data regarding best
practices for programs that mediate non-
family civil matters.1 Throughout the
article, we consider the answers provided
by research to three questions: (1) How
does program design affect the success
of the institutionalization of mediation?
(2) In what ways do design choices affect
the likelihood of achieving settlement of
cases? and (3) Which program design
choices affect litigants' perceptions of
the procedural justice provided by court-
connected mediation? Because these
issues of institutionalization, settlement
and justice are so important to the success
and quality of court-connected media-
tion, they must be considered carefully
in. deciding both how to structure new
court-connected mediation programs and
how to improve existing programs.
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Design and institutionalization
Most court-connected mediation
programs seek successful institutional-
ization, which we define here as regular
and significant use of the mediation pro-
cess to resolve cases. Voluntary medi-
ation programs rarely meet this goal
because they suffer from consistently
small caseloads. In contrast, programs
that make mediation mandatory (at the
request of one party or on a judge's own
initiative) have dramatically higher rates
of utilization.
Significantly, mandatory referral
does not appear to adversely affect either
litigants' perceptions of procedural jus-
tice or, according to most studies, settle-
ment rates. Further, judicial activism in
ordering parties into mediation triggers
increased voluntary use of the process,
as lawyers begin to request it themselves
in anticipation of court referral. An
additional benefit of exposing lawyers to
mediation is that they are more likely to
mediator and timing). Adopting these
rules (combined with active judicial
support and willingness to order media-
tion when deemed appropriate) tends to
increase requests to use mediation.
The local legal and mediation cul-
tures influence how quickly mediation
is integrated into the court system, as
well as which program design features
are more (or less) acceptable. Knowl-
edgeable leadership from the bar and
the judiciary contribute to the growth of
mediation programs.
Thus, mediation programs that
obtain the input and support of the bench
and the bar and that involve mandatory
Good program design can maximize the use of
court-connected civil mediation programs and enhance
litigants' perceptions of procedural justice.
discuss and recommend the process to
their clients.
Another program design option
involves requiring lawyers to consider
mediation as an integral part of their
usual litigation planning. For example,
some courts require lawyers to discuss
the potential use of mediation or other
ADR processes and report the results of
that discussion to the court early in the
life of a case. Other courts require law-
yers to discuss ADR with their clients.
These court rules face less lawyer oppo-
sition than mandatory case referral and
can give lawyers more control over the
logistics of mediation (e.g., choice of
consideration or mandatory referral are
more likely to be successfully institu-
tionalized. Mandatory case referrals can
increase use of mediation without com-
promising settlement rates or perceptions
ofjustice.
Which cases should mediate
Many courts have adopted civil
mediation programs in order to encour-
age and obtain the settlement of cases.
And, importantly, both lawyers and lit-
igants view mediation more favorably
and as more procedurally just when set-
tlement is achieved.
Although it has been suggested that
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certain general categories of civil cases
(e.g., employment, contract) are "best"
handled by mediation, there is no empir-
ical support for this notion. Neither set-
tlement rates nor litigants' perceptions of
the procedural justice provided by medi-
ation vary with case type. (There is some
limited evidence, however, that medical
malpractice and product liability cases
may be somewhat less likely to settle
than other types of tort cases.)
Interestingly, the level of acrimony
between the litigants in non-family civil
cases does not seem to affect the like-
lihood of settlement in mediation. Not
surprisingly, the cases most likely to
settle in mediation are those in which the
litigants' positions are closer together,
the issues are less complex, or the issue
of liability is less strongly contested. Lit-
igants' perceptions of procedural justice
do not seem to vary with the tenor of the
relationship between the litigants or with
these other case characteristics.
Thus, because no case characteris-
tics have been identified for which medi-
ation has detrimental effects, mediation
programs do not need to exclude certain
types of cases. Some programs may be
tempted to exclude the cases that seem
likely to reach settlement on their own,
without the assistance of a mediator.
This choice, however, is likely to limit
not only the rate of settlement achieved
but also the opportunity to- improve liti-
gants' perceptions of the procedural jus-
tice of the settlement process and to
enhance their views of the courts.2
When to mediate
Without a statute or court rule to the
contrary, mediation tends to occur late
in the life of a case and often after all
discovery is completed. Holding media-
tion sessions sooner after cases are filed,
however, yields several benefits. Cases
are more likely to settle, fewer motions
are filed and decided, and case disposi-
tion time is shorter, even for cases that
do not settle in mediation.
Local litigation customs and case
management practices affect lawyers'
comfort with the early use of mediation,
and the chance of settlement is reduced
somewhat if lawyers lack critical infor-
mation about their cases. Discovery does
not have to be completed, however, for
cases to settle. In addition, the status
of dispositive and other motions tends
to affect the likelihood of settlement in
mediation. If motions are pending, set-
tlement is less likely. Litigants' percep-
tions of the procedural justice provided
by mediation, meanwhile, do not seem to
vary with the timing of the session.
Thus, program designers should con-
sider scheduling mediation sessions to be
held at some reasonable point before dis-
covery is completed but only after dis-
positive or other critical motions have
been decided.
Who the mediators should be
Mediation is most likely to be suc-
cessfully institutionalized if the medi-
ators are drawn from the pool that is
preferred by lawyers: litigators with
knowledge in the substantive areas being
mediated. But neither mediators' knowl-
edge of the subject matter of the dispute
nor the number of years they have prac-
ticed law3 has proved to be related to
settlement or to litigants' perceptions of
procedural justice.
One characteristic of the mediators,
namely having more mediation expe-
rience, is related to more settlements.
However, several aspects of mediator
training, such as the number of hours
of training or whether it included role
effects on settlement or on litigants' per-
ceptions of justice.
What the mediators should do
The approach that mediators ought
to use (facilitative, evaluative, transfor-
mative) has been the subject of much
debate. Both active facilitation and some
types of evaluative interventions tend
to produce more settlements as well as
heighten perceptions of procedural jus-
tice.4
For example, when mediators dis-
close their views about the merits or
value of a case, cases are more likely
to settle and litigants are more likely
to assess the mediation process as fair.
By contrast, when mediators keep silent
about their views of the case, cases are
less likely to settle and litigants' views
of procedural justice are not enhanced.
But when mediators recommend a par-
ticular settlement, litigants' ratings of the
procedural fairness of the process suffer,
notwithstanding an increased rate of set-
tlement.
When litigants or their lawyers par-
ticipate more during mediation, cases
are more likely to settle than when they
participate less. Moreover, the litigants
evaluate the mediation process as more
fair. In addition, when the lawyers
behave more cooperatively during medi-
Although it has been suggested that certain general
categories of civil cases - such as employment
and contract - are "best" handled by mediation,
there is no empirical support for this notion.
play, tend not to affect settlement. None
of these mediator characteristics seem to
be related to litigants' perceptions of the
procedural justice of mediation.
Thus, program design options that
maximize each mediator's level of expe-
rience, such as the use of in-house medi-
ators or a limited roster, may enhance
the success of the program more than a
roster with many mediators who get no
or few cases to mediate. Matching medi-
ators to cases based on subject matter
expertise makes lawyers more comfort-
able with the process, but not doing so
has not been shown to have detrimental
ation sessions, both the likelihood of
settlement and litigant perceptions of
procedural fairness increase.
Thus, the training, ethical guidelines
and monitoring tools applicable to court-
connected mediation programs should
encourage mediators to facilitate partici-
pation by both litigants and their lawyers
and to enhance the amount of coop-
eration during the session. Programs
need not discourage all evaluative inter-
ventions, but should restrict those, such
as recommending particular settlements,
that reduce litigants' perceptions of the
fairness of the mediation process.
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Roles for lawyers
In civil mediation sessions, lawyers
generally speak on their clients' behalf
and, consequently, do more of the talk-
ing. Neither settlement nor litigants'
perceptions of procedural justice tend to
be harmed by this allocation of respon-
sibility between the lawyer and client.
As noted earlier, greater participation by
both lawyers and clients is beneficial.
Litigants' presence during the session is
important for several reasons, most nota-
bly because litigants who are not present
view the dispute resolution process as
less fair. Lawyers also perceive that their
clients' presence changes the lawyers'
role in settlement, makes the clients'
interests more relevant and influences
ultimate outcomes.
Preparation for the mediation ses-
sion also is important. The more law-
yers prepare their clients for mediation,
the greater the likelihood of settlement in
mediation and the greater the litigants'
perception of procedural fairness. As
noted earlier, greater cooperation among
the lawyers during mediation also has
these benefits. Interestingly, both greater
client preparation and more cooperation
among lawyers lead attorneys as well as
their clients to view the mediation pro-
cess as more fair.
Thus, court-connected mediation
programs should encourage litigants to
attend and participate in mediation ses-
sions. Attorneys should be expected
to prepare their clients for mediation,
and mediation programs should provide
information to assist their preparation.
Lawyers should adopt a cooperative
rather than a contentious approach during
the session.
Advice for program designers
In this article, we have presented
empirical data that address the effects
that important program design choices
have on institutionalization, settlement
and perceptions of justice. We assume
that court-connected mediation programs
are concerned about all three of these
issues, although courts' desire to insti-
tutionalize mediation or encourage set-
tlement should never overwhelm their
commitment to justice. The research sug-
gests that the following program design
options can enhance one or more of these
three components without diminishing
any of the others:
To maximize the use of
court-connected civil
mediation programs
- Enlist the bench and bar in devel-
oping a program that fits the local
legal culture.
. Obtain on-going judicial support
for referring cases to the program.
- Make mediation use compulsory if
one side requests it, or require attor-
neys to consider mediation early in
the litigation process.
To increase the likelihood of
settlement in mediation
. Schedule sessions fairly early in
the life of a case.
. Require that critical motions be
decided before the session.
. Adopt a system that ensures that
the mediators get enough cases to
keep their mediation skills sharp.
To heighten litigants'
perceptions that the program
provides procedural justice
- Require litigants to attend the ses-
sion and invite them, along with their
attorneys, to participate.
- Urge lawyers to adopt a coopera-
tive approach and prepare their cli-
ents for mediation.5
. Restrict more extreme evaluative
interventions such as recommending
a specific settlement.
Finally, research has not kept pace with
the rate of implementation of court-con-
nected civil mediation programs. To
contribute to our knowledge regarding
the impact of these and other program
design choices, program designs should
include a research component that per-
mits their evaluation.
Endnotes
1 The program design effects observed in
the small number of studies conducted to
date might reflect circumstances particular to
the courts studied. Accordingly, the effects
reported in these studies and described in
this article might not be found in other courts.
For studies regarding attorneys' percep-
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ADR Pilot Project, 7 ME. B.J. 310 (1992);
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For a review of research regarding the
effects of process characteristics on percep-
tions of procedural justice, see Nancy Welsh,
Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation:
What's Justice Got To Do With It? 79 WASH. U.
L. Q. 787 (2001).
2 Litigants have concerns about the proce-
dural fairness of attorneys' traditional negotia-
tion of settlements because they generally
are excluded from the negotiation and, as a
result, are not convinced that such negotia-
tion represents a careful and thorough dis-
pute resolution process. In contrast, litigants
tend to view mediation as procedurally just.
I All mediators studied were lawyers; the
effect of their litigation experience was not
examined.
I The effects of transformative interventions
have not been examined in the court context.
I This approach and that immediately preced-
ing will contribute not only to more favorable
perceptions of mediation but also to more
settlements.
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